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Abstract 
The city of Milan, one of the most car-dependent and polluted in Europe, is also among the few to have 
introduced a road pricing measure. The story of how this happened is of great interest, for it shows how EU 
regulations, scientific evidence and political action at the local level have concurred to bring about change in 
the city’s transport policy. Unlike the well-known cases of London and Stockholm, it is concerns for the 
levels of pollution (rather than congestion) that have led to the introduction of the “Ecopass” scheme in 
2008. Accordingly, in the following years the public debate has focused on the effectiveness of this pollution 
charge in reducing PM10 – a pollutant with adverse health impacts. Based on the analysis of media coverage 
and official reports, this paper argues that EU regulations had a crucial role in determining the 
newsworthiness of PM10 in Milan. Media and public concerns have then put increasing pressure on 
politicians to find a solution to the “emergency”. The dubious effectiveness of Ecopass in reducing PM10 
levels then has had two kinds of consequences. First, the scheme was upgraded to a congestion charge in 
2012, following the results of a bottom-up referendum in which a large majority of voters demanded both an 
upgrade and an extension of the Ecopass area: this stands in stark contrast with the experience of other cities, 
where voters have turned down charging schemes (e.g. Edinburgh, Manchester). Second, the new city 
administration has recently implemented a monitoring system for Black Carbon, a new PM metric that is 
more suitable to prove the effectiveness of traffic restrictions. Overall, the paper shows how all actors 
involved in the process (politicians, media and civil society groups) made strategic use of scientific evidence 
on pollution, in order to bring forward their own agendas. 
Keywords: public acceptability, road pricing, congestion charging, air pollution, sustainable transport, car 
use, referendum 
 
1. Sustainable transport policy and road pricing 
The transport sector is a major contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: in 2005 it accounted for 
approximately 23% of the world’s CO2 (Schäfer et al., 2009), and within this sector, the motor car is the 
second biggest contributor behind road freight (Chapman, 2007). Moreover, the reason why it is seen as the 
most difficult and worrying part of the climate change agenda is that – unlike other sectors – its impact is 
likely to increase rather than diminish in the next few decades (Chapman, 2007; Johansson, 2009): transport 
is today the fastest-growing source of energy-related GHG emissions, and thus its relative importance is 
likely to increase at  such a rate that it will be difficult to reverse for technological improvements alone 
(Schäfer et al., 2009). 
In the context of research on sustainable transport, there is a consensus about the need for comprehensive 
policy packages that include action in the following directions (Banister, 2005): improving technology and 
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energy efficiency; improving modal alternatives to the most polluting means of transport (such as the motor 
car); changing the built environment, in order to reduce travel distance and the need for car use; targeting 
individual attitudes and behaviour in order to achieve a modal shift away from the car; finally, the 
introduction of pricing measures is generally considered to be essential if sustainable transport is to be 
achieved. For example, the European Union White Paper on transport argues that:  
 “in the urban context, a mixed strategy involving land-use planning, pricing  schemes, efficient 
public transport services and infrastructure for non-motorised modes and charging/refuelling of clean 
vehicles is needed to reduce congestion and emissions” (European Commission, 2011, p. 13) 
In practice, however, forms of road pricing have generally been discussed and/or introduced as tools to 
tackle local problems such as congestion and air pollution, notably in urban areas, rather than as part of a 
comprehensive strategy to reduce travel-related GHG emissions  
2. The public acceptability and political feasibility of road pricing  
The fact that road pricing has often been discussed as a tool to tackle congestion in urban areas is not 
surprising. Indeed, the idea of congestion charging has a long history, being first put forward by transport 
economists in the 1920s (Pigou, 1920). In the following decades, transport scholars have widely discussed 
the implications of pricing, generally agreeing that it is an effective way of internalizing the externalities of 
transport while reducing car use and related congestion problems. In that sense, as Eliasson puts it, when the 
first congestion charging proposals started to be discussed in Europe at the turn of the 21st century, 
“transport economists had been waiting for a hundred years” (2009, p. 205). 
There are several reasons for such a delay: for a long time the main obstacle was the lack of the technology 
required for the automatic enforcement of the charge. While Singapore introduced its well-known Area 
Licensing Scheme in 1975, this was based on a combination of overhead gantries and visual checks on the 
part of police officers (Seik, 1997). Since a couple of decades, with the introduction of new technologies 
such as automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) systems, technology is no longer an issue (de Palma & 
Lindsey, 2011; Iseki & Demisch, 2012). As of today, researchers agree that the single most important 
obstacle to the introduction of transport pricing schemes is the lack of public acceptability (Schade & 
Schlag, 2000; Hårsman, 2001; Hårsman, Pädam, & Wijkmark, 2001). This factor explains why in many 
cities congestion charging is simply not on the agenda, as well as why projects have been considered, but 
not implemented in cities such as Edinburgh (McQuaid & Grieco, 2005; Saunders, 2005; Gaunt, Rye, & 
Allen, 2007; Gorman, Higgins, & Muirie, 2008), Manchester (Ahmed, 2011; Vigar, Shaw, & Swann, 2011), 
New York (Schaller, 2010) and Hong Kong (Ison & Rye, 2005).  
Understandably, the lack of public acceptance and political feasibility of congestion charging has attracted 
considerable research attention in the recent past. Due to the scarcity of real-world case studies, much 
empirical work has relied on stated preference methods, which generally amount to asking people how they 
judge such a measure (Jaensirisak, Wardman, & May, 2005; Zheng & Hensher, 2012). These studies have 
generally concluded that  public acceptance is very low virtually everywhere, even though they have shed 
light on the factors responsible for variations in the degree of acceptance (Link & Polak, 2004; Jaensirisak, 
Wardman, & May, 2005; Brundell-Freji & Jonsson, 2009; Gehlert et al., 2011; Souche, Raux, & Croissant, 
2012). More recently, a few cities have held referenda on congestion charging, thus making available for the 
first time “revealed preference” data on this topic. Overall, these “real-world experiments” have generally 
confirmed the low acceptance of congestion charging – with a few very interesting exceptions.   
In Edinburgh, a city council plan to introduce a congestion charging scheme has been rejected with a large 
majority (74%) in 2005 (McQuaid & Grieco, 2005; Saunders, 2005; Gaunt, Rye, & Allen, 2007; Gorman, 
Higgins, & Muirie, 2008). Similarly, 79% of Manchester citizens rejected in 2008 a “Greater Manchester 
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Transport Innovation Fund” which included, besides considerable investment in public transport, a 
congestion charging scheme (Ahmed, 2011; Vigar, Shaw, & Swann, 2011). These electoral results have been 
widely interpreted in the UK as proof that it is impossible to introduce such schemes if citizens are allowed 
to vote directly – indeed, the world’s best known scheme, the London Congestion Charge, has been 
introduced in 2003 without referendum. By contrast, in Stockholm a narrow majority of voters (51%) has 
voted in favour of a similar scheme in 2006, after a full scale trial had taken place in the city for seven 
months (Gullberg & Isaksson, 2009b). Understandably, this “unexpected yes” (Eliasson & Jonsson, 2011) 
has attracted considerable research attention (Eliasson & Hultkrantz, 2009; Hårsman & Quigley, 2010): in 
this context, Swedish scholars have often emphasized the “lessons” that other cities around the world might 
draw from the scheme’s design and the process of implementation (Eliasson, 2008; Gullberg & Isaksson, 
2009a; Börjesson et al., 2012).  
While the research attention paid to the aforementioned case studies is well deserved, it is surprising that 
only a few international publications focus on the case of Milan (Lapsley & Giordano, 2010; Rotaris et al., 
2010; Danielis et al., 2011). Indeed, several scholars seem unaware of this case study: for example, Gullberg 
& Isaksson, in their study about Stockholm, provide a list of “places that occur in the literature on road 
charging” that includes 31 cities from all over the world, but not Milan (2009b, p. 175). This lack of attention 
is problematic, since recent events arguably make Milan the most interesting case study for the acceptability 
of congestion charging: while a “pollution charge” aimed at reducing traffic and polluting emissions in the 
city centre was implemented in 2008, three years later, in a bottom-up referendum promoted by an 
environmental association, 79% of voters voted in favour of extending the measure to all vehicle types, 
increasing the charge and progressively extending the charging area. Such levels of acceptance are indeed 
unprecedented, and challenging for conventional wisdom on congestion charging.  
In this paper, we try to make sense of this surprising electoral result, by focusing on the role of evidence 
about air pollution levels. The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we focus on the city of 
Milan, and put forward a list of possible reasons for the high levels of acceptance. Then, we illustrate the 
normative context of the introduction of a pollution charge in the city. In the following two sections, we 
describe the pollution charge scheme introduced in 2008 (Ecopass) and the congestion charging implemented 
in 2012, following the results of the local referendum (Area C). In both sections, we focus in particular on 
the use that different actors (politicians, associations, media, etc.) have made of scientific evidence about 
concentrations of air pollutants. Finally, the conclusion discusses the implications of the case study, with 
regard to the use of evidence in environmental policy making.   
3. Possible reasons for high acceptance of congestion charging in Milan 
Northern Italy is one of the most densely populated areas of Europe, accounting for about 28 million people 
living in the Po Valley and in the surrounding mountains. The metropolitan area of Milan accounts for a 
large portion of this megalopolis: in a recent study aimed to define the borders of Italian metropolitan areas, 
Boffi and Palvarini argue that the metropolitan area of Milan accounts for approximately 7.5 million 
inhabitants, covering  most of the area between the city of Milan and the alpine lakes in northern Lombardy 
(2011). The area so defined is considerably larger than the city proper, which accounts for just 1.3 million 
inhabitants, while the rest of the area is fragmented in a myriad of municipalities.  
Milan is commonly referred to as the “economic capital of Italy”, and it is indeed a prosperous metropolis 
which has successfully transitioned from an industrial to a major service city, notably in the fields of media, 
design and fashion. However, observers generally highlight that this economic success is hampered by 
deficiencies in territorial government, as well as by poor quality of life (OECD, 2006). Dell’Agnese and 
Anzoise, for example, have argued that Milan represents “the classic hyper-congested urban reality, where a 
myopic management of the urban growth and its environmental costs has severely curbed living standards” 
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(2011, p. 221). A major factor for this situation is that the metropolitan area of Milan is one of the most car 
dependent in Europe, with a car ownership rate of 0.6 cars per inhabitants and a modal share of 47% in the 
municipality (Comune di Milano, 2009): indeed, Milan is “among the cities with the highest car 
concentration in the world” (Rotaris et al. 2010, p.360). High levels of car dependence are the one the major 
factors behind the problems of congestion and pollution, which in turn are often mentioned as reasons for 
poor quality of living.  
Overall, public policy in the last decades has devoted little attention to quality of life and environmental 
issues. For example, Lazarini and Nardi have recently concluded that climate change is a weak driver of 
municipal policies in Milan, especially if compared to other European cities (2012). Accordingly, it is 
surprising to find such a city at the forefront of sustainable transport policy and acceptance of environmental 
taxes. Adding to the puzzling nature of this case study, Milan is the only major European city where (to our 
knowledge) a charging scheme has been put forward by a right-wing city government: in fact in Edinburgh, 
Manchester, London and Stockholm the city council was controlled by labour, social-democratic and/or 
environmental parties at the time of approval.  
This facts suggest that there should be something peculiar about this case study. Accordingly, in the 
following we put forward a list of possible reasons for the high acceptance of congestion charging shown by 
the referendum results. It must be stressed that these are mere hypothesis and – in the absence of more in-
depth studies – should be regarded only as possible future research directions. Similarly, we have ordered the 
factors by increasing importance, based on our assumptions, rather than on an empirical appraisal of the 
relative weight of different factors.  
1. The wording on the ballot papers might have increased the acceptability of the scheme: indeed, the 
referendum question put forward a comprehensive strategy for sustainable transport (including 
improvement to public transport, bike lanes and the like) to be financed with an upgraded and 
expanded charging scheme (see below). As previous research indicates, “if the aim of the charges is 
not explained, nor what will happen to the income, there is less likelihood of the tax being accepted” 
(Gullberg & Isaksson, 2009b, p. 140-141): accordingly, the fact that the ballot papers illustrated a 
detailed policy package might have increased the percentage of yeas. 
2. The simultaneity with other four local environmental referenda, where more than 90% of voters have 
voted “yes” might have induced a response-set effect among voters. 
3. In addition, the simultaneity with national referenda held on the very same day is likely to have 
increased voter turnout: notably, the contemporary carrying out of a nationwide popular referendum 
on the ban of nuclear power, a mere three months after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, has probably 
been the major contributing factor in this context. 
4. The referendum was held in a moment of political change, with the right wing coalition in power at 
both the national and the local levels losing support among voters. Accordingly, the city of Milan, 
for almost twenty years a stronghold of Italian conservatives, elected a left-wing Mayor in May 
2011, merely a couple of weeks before the referendum. Our analysis of electoral data at the census-
tract level (not reported here in detail for the sake of brevity) shows that the percentage of yeas is 
highly correlated with the vote for the left-wing mayoral candidate two weeks before, even after 
controlling for other possible confounding factors. Accordingly, we put forward the hypothesis that 
political factors might have been crucial in determining the success of the poll: indeed, voters seem 
to have used local and national referenda to signal their discontent with Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-
right coalition (ruling both the city and the Italian State at the time). 
5. A further possible reason for the high acceptance of the pricing measure is the small area covered by 
the scheme: the historical city centre of Milan, corresponding to just 8 km
2
, considerably less than 
London (22 km
2
) and Stockholm (47 km
2
); also the schemes rejected by voters in Edinburgh and 
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Manchester were supposed to cover a much wider area. While this can be considered a reason for the 
higher level of acceptance observed in Milan, it is unlikely to be the main one: indeed 79% of 
Milanese voters actually agreed to progressively extend the area to include all the neighbourhoods 
inside the so-called “railway ring”. Such an extension (which as of today has not been implemented) 
would expand the area considerably, making it more similar to comparable schemes in other 
European cities. 
6. Our study of the Milan case, however, lead us to think that the single most important reason for high 
levels of public acceptance and support is the fact that here, unlike in other cities, it is concerns for 
the levels of pollution (rather than congestion) that have led to the introduction of Ecopass in 2008. 
Accordingly, in the following years the public debate has focused on the effectiveness of this 
pollution charge in reducing PM10 – a pollutant with adverse health impacts. This is likely to have 
boosted acceptance, as previous research based on stated preference data shows that the attitudes are 
more positive when the charging scheme is aimed at compensating for the pollution caused by 
drivers (Jaensirisak, Wardman, & May, 2005; Souche, Raux, & Croissant, 2012): for instance 
Eliasson and Jonsson, in a study focused on Stockholm find “a strong connection between 
environmental concerns and positive attitudes to congestion charge” and argue that “the politicians’ 
decision to ‘‘re-label’’ the congestion charges to ‘‘environmental charges’’ and emphasizing their 
positive effects on air quality may very well have had a positive impact on acceptability” (2011, p. 
363).  
Discussing the relevance of all factors listed above is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Accordingly, in 
the following we will focus on the latter point: notably, we will illustrate the crucial role of evidence about 
levels of air pollutants and their impact on health in the public debate that has accompanied the introduction 
of charging in Milan, as well as the strategic use of evidence made by all actors involved. The paper is based 
on desk research, notably focused on official reports and press articles for the period 2008-2012. Therefore, 
it is best conceived as a preliminary study, which will hopefully pave the way for further more in-depth 
research.  
4. The normative context: air pollution in the Milan area 
A crucial element to understand how Milan’s congestion charging came about is the normative context at the 
EU level. In the context of the EU policy on air quality, the directive 1999/30/EC (later integrated in the 
directive 2008/50/EC) has set limit values for PM10, which member states had to comply by 2005. PM10 
refers to atmospheric particulate matter with a diameter of 10 micrometers or less, which is proven to have 
serious health effects in terms of cardiopulmonary mortality (including lung cancer) (Kappos, et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, the directive sets two concentration levels: a daily value of 50 µg/m
3
, that should be exceeded 
for not more than 35 days per calendar year; and a calendar year average of 40 µg/m
3
. The directive has been 
transposed in Italian law three years later, with a Ministerial Decree (D.M. 60/2002). As it is always the case 
with EU directives, failure to comply may lead to a non-compliance procedure, and to the Commission 
taking member states to the European Court of Justice, and this in turn can result in financial penalties for the 
member state. Indeed, the high concentrations of PM10 in several Italian areas has led the European 
Commission to take Italy (as well as several other European States) to the European Court of Justice in 2010. 
In this context, Northern Italy is one of the areas of Europe where daily limit values have been exceeded 
more often and average annual concentrations are higher. There are three main reasons for this: firstly, as 
illustrated, this is one of the most densely populated and industrialized area of the country, as well as of 
Europe. Secondly, levels of car use are very high, partly as a result of insufficient public transport supply. 
Finally, and most importantly, the role of adverse geo-climatic conditions has to be taken into account: 
indeed, the Po valley is almost enclosed by the Alps and the Appenine Mountains; accordingly, wind speed 
is usually low and temperature inversion is common during the winter. These geo-climatic conditions 
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contribute greatly to the high concentration of air pollution that is observed in this region: indeed, experts 
argue that “if in Milan there was a wind speed of 2,5 m/sec (average in European cities), instead of 0,9m/sec 
(..), that would result in only 3 days per year beyond limit values – all emissions being equal” (Commissione 
Ecopass, 2010, p. 16). Given these conditions, PM10 levels in the Po Valley regularly exceed the limit values 
set by the European Commission. The same goes for Milan, where in the last decade a decrease was 
observed: this trend is related to vehicle fleet change, with the progressive introduction of new, cleaner 
vehicles, as well as to more structural determinants such as the reduction of industrial activity and, since 
2008, the economic crisis, which has kept travel demand down in the last few years (Commissione Ecopass, 
2010). Despite these reductions, the Milan area is still exceeding EU limit values: in 2010 the number of 
days exceeding the threshold was 86, more than double those allowed (ibidem).  
5. A “pollution charge”: Ecopass (2008-2011)  
Having set the context, in this section we describe the story of congestion charging in Milan more in detail, 
focusing on the pollution charge in force between January 2008 and January 2012. Tab.1 presents a sketchy 
chronology of the events, from the first discussions about charging to the introduction of a fully-fledged 
congestion charge in 2012.  
Period Mayor Events 
2001-2006 Albertini (right) Discussions about road pricing “ticket” for access to the city centre 
2006-2008 
Moratti (right) 
Ecopass in the making 
1/2008 Ecopass implemented 
2009-2011 Ecopass in question 
5-6/2011 
Pisapia (left) 
Mayoral elections and referendum 
1/2012 – present Area C implemented 
 
Tab. 1– Chronology of events 
The idea of levying a “ticket” for the access of vehicles to the city centre was discussed intensively during 
the second mandate of Mayor Gabriele Albertini (centre-right) in 2001-2006 (Lapsley & Giordano, 2010). In 
this phase, the reason for the interest in road pricing are to be found in the then-recent EU Directive on air 
quality, as well as the example of the London congestion charge (implemented in 2003). Still, Albertini 
preferred to defer the matter to the successor, Letizia Moratti (centre-right), who was elected in 2006. After 
two further years of discussion, a charge for the access to the city centre was finally implemented in January 
2008, under the name of Ecopass. In the two following years, the public debate focused on the alleged lack 
of effectiveness of Ecopass in cutting PM10 concentrations: in this period, the scheme increasingly came 
under the fire of critics, notably from the ranks of the municipal majority. While the mayoral elections of 
May 2011 saw the unexpected victory of left-wing candidate Giuliano Pisapia, a bottom-up referendum on 
traffic policy held a few weeks later resulted in a clear majority of yeas (79%). Accordingly, in January 2012 
the new city government upgraded Ecopass into a fully-fledged congestion charge named “Area C” (where 
the “C” stands for “city centre” as well as for “congestion”), in accordance with the results of the 
referendum.  
The Ecopass scheme of 2008-2011 had several peculiar characteristics: as noted above, the covered area was 
small, corresponding to the perimeter of the 16
th
 century city walls; one of the reasons for choosing it was 
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that an ANPR system was already in place, and thus the implementation of the charge did not require a huge 
investment in technology. The charge was levied between 7:30 and 19:30 on working days, and it varied 
between 2 and 10 Euros. There was a high level of differentiation of the charge according to the Euro 
Emission Standard of the vehicle: indeed, several categories of vehicles considered as less polluting 
(including, among others, petrol fuelled vehicles with Euro 3 or higher standard) were totally exempted from 
the charge; for other vehicles, the level of the charge varied from 2 to 5 Euro, depending again on the Euro 
Emission Standard. Moreover, the scheme included discounts for frequent users and residents, and was 
conceived as part of a wider transport policy package including also public transport improvements.  
The striking feature of Ecopass, if compared to other congestion charging schemes in Europe, is that it was 
focused mostly on pollution reduction. As acknowledged by the Municipal Agency for Mobility, 
Environment and Territory (AMAT) “(the) specific goal (of Ecopass was) to answer the environmental 
emergency due to the recurrent exceeding of the limit values for PM10 set by the EU” (AMAT, 2011). 
Accordingly, as Rotaris et al. have observed, that the charge was “mainly conceived and communicated as a 
pollution charge (with), congestion mentioned only as a side-goal” (2010, p.361). Also the periodic 
monitoring reports produced during the period 2008-2011 (see for example AMAT, 2010) mainly focused on 
air pollution reductions, and paid only little attention to other positive side-effects of the charging (reduced 
number of accidents, increased speed of public transport in the charging area, etc.). Similarly, the 
information and advertising campaign that accompanied the launch of Ecopass was very much focused on 
pollution: one of the posters depicted a kid on a toy car, with the caption  “With Ecopass, green light to non-
polluting cars. Less traffic, more clean air”. Incidentally, it is interesting to observe that this advertising 
implicitly conveyed the message that more recent vehicles (Euro 3 to 5), that were exempted from the 
charge, were to be considered as non-polluting, despite the fact that they can have very high emission factors 
(for example, when engine size is big). Broadly speaking, the way in which Ecopass was advertised is 
consistent with the findings of Gullberg and Isaksson who, reviewing the literature on the implementation of 
congestion charging projects note that “in order to mobilise external support, there is a tendency (..) to 
exaggerate what can be achieved, how fast things will proceed and how cheap it will be” (2009b, p. 44).  
With regard to the impacts of Ecopass, the following has been observed (Commissione Ecopass, 2010): in 
terms of vehicle access to the charging zone, a drastic drop in 2008 (-21%) was almost immediately followed 
by a slow but steady increase which, however, was not enough to bring it back to pre-charging levels. This 
was accompanied by a rapid increase in the share of exempted vehicles: while in 2007 50% of vehicles 
entering the area would have been exempted from Ecopass, in the first year of the scheme this percentage 
went up to 75%. In 2010, the share of exempted vehicles was as high as 90%. Clearly, vehicle fleet change 
(possibly accelerated by the incentive to buy a new car given by the charge) gradually reduced the dissuasive 
power of Ecopass. This stands in stark contrast with the charging schemes of London and Stockholm, were 
the share of exempted vehicles has remained quite low throughout the years. In terms of PM10 concentrations 
at the city level, some improvement was observed, notably in the first years, even though it was not aligned 
with the policy target nor with European value limits. In detail, there was a big drop in the number of days 
over limit in 2008, which is likely to be the result of an abnormally high level of rainfalls (reducing 
concentrations of pollutants) during that year, even though media and politicians often interpreted it as a sign 
of the effectiveness of Ecopass (see below). However, in 2009 Milan reached the threshold of 35 days on the 
22th February (AMAT, 2010); the following year, this happened on the 38th day of the year, marking the 
worst result since 2006. Overall, the expert panel in charge of the evaluation of Ecopass concluded in 2010 
that the scheme had an impact on the reduction of polluting emissions in the charging area; however, given 
the reduced size of the area, this effect was barely discernible at the city level, let alone to the regional level 
(Commissione Ecopass, 2010).  
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5.1 The media coverage  
Across the period 2008-2011, then, the initial apparent drop in traffic and pollution of the first year was 
followed by increasing doubts about the ability of Ecopass to reach its stated objectives. As this happened, 
the public debate became more and more heated. In this context, it is interesting to focus on how the media 
covered the issue of air pollution in Milan. First of all, an analysis of local media coverage shows that EU 
limit values (both at the daily and the annual level) were used as threshold for newsworthiness. This had a 
double and contradictory effect: on one hand, a day with concentrations exceeding the limit was generally 
considered as a “polluting” and thus newsworthy day. On the other hand, the effect of the 35-day clause was 
that, paradoxically, each year media attention was greater in the first two-three months of the year, before 
the 35th day was reached; then, with the “countdown” over, media attention tended to drop. This is also 
related to the marked seasonal variation in PM10 levels in the area (Commissione Ecopass, 2010): indeed, 
for climatic reasons as well as for the additional contribution of home heating, PM10, levels are markedly 
higher during the winter. Media attention generally followed suit, with the issue of air pollution generally 
disappearing from the headlines during the summer months. Broadly speaking, it appears that local media 
often presented the issue as a matter of “pollution emergency” (following, for example, a week were PM10 
concentrations had been especially high) rather than as a chronic problem with an oscillating trend. 
Moreover, the local media generally emphasized (and possibly exaggerated) the health impacts of air 
pollution, as well as the effectiveness of charging in reducing them: for example the daily Il Giorno, a mere 
three months after the introduction of Ecopass, argued that the slightly lower number of hospital admissions 
for pulmonary conditions in 2008 (as compared to the same period in 2007) was proof of the effectiveness 
of the scheme
2
.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the attitude towards Ecopass was very positive in the major local newspapers. 
For example the local edition of the Milan-based daily Corriere della Sera often published comments by 
Prof. Edoardo Croci, arguably one of the main driving forces behind the introduction of charging (see 
below): this happened both during
3
 and after his term as local councillor for Transport (2006-2009). Indeed, 
in the period between his resignation from the post (November 2009) and the referendum (June 2011), at 
least ten leading articles and letters written by Croci in favour of the upgrading of Ecopass were published 
in the local edition of the daily
4
. The support of Corriere della Sera to the cause of charging is confirmed by 
other leading articles during the period, where the reluctance of Mayor Moratti to upgrade the charging 
scheme was criticized and readers were encouraged to vote yes in the upcoming referendum
5
. Also the local 
edition of the left-wing daily La Repubblica held a similar stance, emphasizing the criticism towards the 
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right-wing mayor
6
. Even the national edition of La Gazzetta dello Sport, a major Italian newspaper mostly 
dedicated to the coverage of sports, following a period of alleged “pollution emergency” in January 2010, 
published an article praising Ecopass but criticizing the excessive number of exemptions granted by the 
scheme
7
. In all these articles, the  reference to evidence about harmful levels of air pollution and the related 
concerns for public health was dominant.  
In a nutshell, then, local media in Milan were quite supportive of the principle behind Ecopass, even to the 
point of calling for an upgrading of the charging scheme. This fact stands in stark contrast with the cases of 
other European cities where attempts at introducing charging schemes have been made: indeed, both in 
Edinburgh (McQuaid & Grieco, 2005; Saunders, 2005; Gaunt, Rye, & Allen, 2007; Gorman, Higgins, & 
Muirie, 2008) and Manchester (Vigar, Shaw, & Swann, 2011) the hostility of the media is considered to have 
been a major factor in the rejection of congestion charging proposals. Even in the case of Stockholm the 
media attitude was very critical towards the congestion charging, at least before the trial (Gullberg & 
Isaksson, 2009b). Therefore, we put forward the hypothesis that this difference might be explained by the 
different framing of the charging scheme in Milan, where the issue was perceived as one of air pollution and 
public health, rather than merely as a transport and congestion issue. Arguably, the positive media attitude 
towards the principle of Ecopass has increased the acceptance of the scheme, as well as putting considerable 
pressure on public authorities to tackle the air pollution problem.  
5.2 The use of evidence on PM by Ecopass proponents 
Local media were not alone in using evidence about air quality to support an upgrading of Ecopass: 
proponents and supporters of the scheme also drew extensively on PM figures to put forward their 
arguments. To exemplify this, in this section we focus on the case of Edoardo Croci, often referred to in the 
media as “the father of Ecopass”. Professor of Institutions of Economics at a local private University, Croci 
was named Transport, Mobility and Environment Local Councillor (the first time these sectors were brought 
together) by Mayor Moratti in 2006. In this position, Croci was responsible for initiating Ecopass. Due to 
conflicts in the municipal majority (which included, but were not limited to, the issue of Ecopass) Croci was 
forced to resign in November 2009. Merely a couple of months later, Croci was among the founders of 
Milano si Muove, the association which promoted the bottom-up referendum for the upgrading of the 
scheme.  
To begin with, an analysis of Croci’s statements to the local media over the years 2008-2011 shows that, also 
in this case, the health impacts of the measure were often emphasized and possibly exaggerated. For 
example, in February 2011 Croci defended Ecopass’ record by arguing that:  
“with the exception of the most critical periods, between 2006 and 2006 there has been a significant 
improvement to air quality. The annual average concentration of PM has decreased by 10µg/m
3
. This 
means, in terms of public health an increase in life expectancy of six months”
8
 (emphasis added) 
Secondly, and more importantly, almost from the start Croci tended to present Ecopass as a work in progress, 
for example referring to it as a “dynamic tool which needs to be upgraded” if it has to survive
9
, or as “an 
                                                           
6
 Berni, I. (2010, May 12). L’Ecopass, da ‘flagship’ a bandiera Bianca. La Repubblica ed. Milano, p. 1; Rho, R. (2010, 
August 22). Abuso di silenzio. La Repubblica ed. Milano, p.1; Berni, I. (2010, November 15). I referendum sono una 
doppia sconfitta del sindaco. La Repubblica ed. Milano, p.1.  
7
 Dell’Arti, G. (2010, January 26). Come mai non si fa più nulla contro lo smog? La Gazzetta dello Sport, p.38.  
8
 Berbenni, M. (2011, February 11). Croci: “Il piano del Comune? Una sconfitta annunciata”. Cronaca Qui, p.6. 
9
 Giannattasio F. (2009, December 27). “Non ammazzate l’Ecopass”. Ticket sospeso dall’1 al 6 gennaio. Corriere della 
Sera – Cronaca Milano, p. 3.  
10 
 
experiment that has never been concluded”
10
. This argument was notably used by Croci to counter claims 
that the effectiveness of Ecopass was decreasing, by arguing that the solution to this problem was simply to 
have “more of the same”. The fact that Croci resorted to this line of argument very soon after the 
introduction of Ecopass
11
 may suggests that he considered Ecopass as “a foot in the door”, i.e. a trial with a 
small scope, useful to gain acceptance for a larger scheme to come. This hypothesis is reinforced by his later 
claims that “the upgrading to a fully-fledged congestion charge was inherent in Ecopass”
12
.  
In this context, it is interesting to note how Croci used both “good” and “bad” values for PM10 to support the 
charging scheme: notably, while low values of PM10 were usually commented by arguing for example that 
“the positive results that have been achieved encourage us to go forward and to set more ambitious goals for 
an urban transformation towards sustainability”
13
, high or increasing levels of particulate matter were 
commented in the following way: “current high levels of pollution confirm the need to strengthen action”
14
.  
5.3 The use of evidence on PM by Ecopass opponents 
If we turn to the use of evidence on PM made by Ecopass opponents, there are other interesting observations 
to be made. To exemplify this, we focus in this section on Matteo Salvini, city council member for Lega 
5ord (centre-right). Even though the party was part of the council majority supporting Mayor Moratti all 
throughout the period 2006-2011, it was often critical of Ecopass.  
In his statements, Salvini often described the charging scheme as a “failed experiment”, founding his claims 
on data showing high and increasing concentrations of PM10. For example, in February 2011 (a few months 
before the municipal elections), he affirmed that “levying a charge for the access to 4% of the municipal 
territory does not make sense. Three years of Ecopass show that and we should have the courage to admit 
that this trial has been a failure”
15
. It is interesting to note, however, that Salvini did not propose to drop 
traffic restrictions altogether – far from it. In fact, he went on record arguing that the best alternative was to 
close entirely to traffic the city centre (or at least parts of it). To deal with so-called periods of 
“environmental emergency”, he suggested to impose traffic restrictions based on odd-even plate numbers of 
vehicles
16
. It must be noted that both solutions were experimented in the city of Milan in the 1980s and 
1990s: accordingly, his stance can be seen as equivalent to preaching a “return to the past”.  
However, it is interesting to note that even opponents of Ecopass did not question the principle of restricting 
car use in the city centre. Arguably, this can be seen as another effect of the dominant framing in terms of 
“public health emergency”: in this context, it is probably difficult for politicians not to propose any solution, 
as this might threaten their support among voters. 
6. Area C: the referendum and the implementation of a new congestion charge 
As illustrated, scepticism about the effectiveness of Ecopass brought about conflicts in the municipal 
majority: partly as a result of this, local councillor Croci was forced to resign in November 2009. In February 
2010, however, he was among the founders of the Association Milano si Muove (“Milan gets moving”) 
which included, besides other politicians, members of the civil society and academics
17
. Starting from June 
2010, Milano si Muove gathered signatures for five local referenda demanding environmental improvements 
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in Milan including (but not limited to) the upgrading of Ecopass to a fully-fledged congestion charge. 25,000 
signatures (considerably more than the 15,000 required by law) were gathered by November 2010. This 
implied that the referendum would have to be held in the same period as the mayoral elections, in spring-
summer 2011.  
The wording on the ballot papers put forward a comprehensive strategy to deal with traffic and mobility  
with several goals, including: to double pedestrian areas by 2012; to double 30km/h areas by 2012; to realise 
a bike lanes network of 300km by 2015; the protection of all bus lanes by 2015; the introduction of a 
neighbourhood bus service; the extension of bike and car sharing services; the implementation of a subway 
service during the night; the improvement of taxi services. This comprehensive strategy for the improvement 
of modal alternatives had to be financed with the levying of a new congestion charge for all vehicles (5-10 
Euros). Moreover, the ballot papers stated that the charging would have to be progressively extended to 
include all the neighbourhoods inside the so-called “railway ring” – a move which would substantially 
increase its size. The stated goals of this package (mentioned on the ballot papers) were a 50% reduction of  
traffic and polluting emissions in the city. The referenda were held on the 12th June 2011, two weeks after 
the second round of the mayoral election. The voter turnout was approximately 49%, considerably more than 
the 30% threshold required for the referenda to be valid. The percentage of yeas was approximately 95% for 
all questions, except for that on congestion charging and transport policy, where the yeas were “only” 79%.  
Following the results of the referendum, in November 2011 the new left-wing majority in the city council 
approved the implementation of a new “congestion charge”
18
. The scheme, which goes under the name of 
“Area C”, entered into force on the 16th January 2012. The main difference with respect to Ecopass is the 
drastic reduction in the number of exemptions, which are limited to vehicles running on alternative fuels, 
while Euro 0 petrol vehicles and diesel fuelled vehicles Euro 1, 2 and 3 are no longer allowed to enter the 
city centre; all other vehicles are charged a 5 Euro ticket. These changes increased the number of charged 
vehicles considerably, from  12% (in the last months of Ecopass) to 92%. By contrast, the charging area was 
not extend, even though the city administration argues that this might happen in the future
19
.  
6.1 The attempt to decouple charging from the pollution issue 
In the months preceding the introduction of Area C, the city government repeatedly stressed that it 
acknowledged that it is impossible to impact on levels of PM10 with a congestion charging scheme in such a 
small area, and put forward new, different objectives for the charge: a reduction of traffic in the area, 
instrumental to an improvement of liveability in the city centre and to the financing of sustainable transport 
policies all over the city (AMAT, 2011). In the first few months since its implementation, Area C appears to 
have achieved its stated goals, at least with regard to traffic reductions, as a further reduction of 34% in 
vehicles accessing to the area (as compared to 2011) has been observed (AMAT, 2012b).   
This stance of the new city government can be interpreted as an attempt to decouple the new congestion 
charge from the issue of PM10 and European Directives. However, it must be noted that among the general 
public as well as in the media, the question is still very much framed in terms of air pollution: this is 
understandable, given that for more than ten years this has been the main framework for the discussion of 
charging. Moreover, as illustrated, EU directives and the resulting threat of financial penalties had been the 
reason why the idea was brought up in the first place, at the turn of the century.  
The fixation of the public debate on air pollution explains in turn why the stance of the new city government 
on air pollution has in fact elements of ambiguity: while city officials have repeatedly stated that a reduction 
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in pollution levels is not one of the main objectives of charging, the city government still seizes every piece 
of evidence, when available, to prove that Area C is effective in reducing air pollution and the related risks 
for health. For example the municipal agency responsible for monitoring the new scheme, in the report 
preceding its introduction, argues that “despite the new priorities, modelling shows that it is likely to achieve 
a considerable reduction in PM10 emissions” (AMAT, 2011, p.34).  
6.2 Black Carbon: a new suitable PM metric 
In this context, a recent development in atmospheric science is likely to make it easier for the city 
government to demonstrate the health impacts of its transport policy. Indeed, a growing number of recent 
studies have focused on Black Carbon (BC) as an alternative (or complementary) statistic for air pollution 
(Wang, et al., 2009; Westerdahl et al., 2009; Bruckmann, 2011; Reche, et al., 2011; Invernizzi, et al., 2011), 
and there many reasons to assume that this new PM metric might be more suitable to prove the effectiveness 
of traffic restrictions. 
A recent review report by the World Health Organisation (Janssen, et al., 2012) argues that BC is a “better 
indicator of harmful particulate substances from combustion sources (especially traffic) than undifferentiated 
PM mass” (p. vii); while this is clear for short-term health effects, there is still considerable uncertainty with 
regard to the long term effect. The same review argues that BC “may not be a major directly toxic 
component”, but is rather a carrier of toxic combustion-derived chemical constituents (p.vii). Moreover, an 
important finding of recent studies is that within-city variability is greater for BC than for PM mass, 
particularly in relation to traffic (p.19). As a result, the report suggests that the health effects of traffic 
limitation policies “may be seriously underestimated when based on effects estimates for PM2.5 or PM10” (p. 
32). Accordingly, it recommends that it be used as an additional indicator “in evaluating local action aimed 
at reducing the population’s exposure to combustion PM (for example, from motorized traffic)” (p. vii).  
Recent studies in Milan have compared concentrations of PM and BC across the city: in 2008, Ruprecht and 
Invernizzi have found no significant difference in PM levels between the Ecopass area and outside (Ruprecht 
& Invernizzi, 2008). In a subsequent study by the same group, however (Invernizzi, et al., 2011), it was 
found that BC levels are considerably lower in the charging area, as compared to the rest of the city; for the 
purpose of this paper, it is interesting to quote at length the abstract of the academic article published in 
Atmospheric Environment:  
“Traffic restrictions are an unpopular tool to mitigate urban air pollution, and a measurable 
improvement in air quality is needed to demonstrate the effectiveness of this measure. Previous 
attempts failed to detect measurable reductions of PM mass pollution within the areas subject to 
traffic restriction. However, black carbon, which is emitted primarily by traffic sources, could be a 
PM metric more suitable to demonstrate pollutant reductions (..)” (Invernizzi, et al., 2011, p. 3522, 
emphasis added) 
In this citation it is apparent that the focus is not so much on whether BC constitutes a better indicator of the 
health impacts of air pollution on health; rather, it is the usefulness of this metric for increasing the public 
acceptability of traffic restrictions that is emphasized. The results of this and subsequent studies on BC levels 
in Milan caught the attention of the local media, and were widely reported as proof of the fact that air quality 
is better in the city centre, as a result of the charging schemes
20
.  
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6.3 The use of evidence on BC and PM by proponents of Area C 
Following the introduction of Area C and the “discovering” of Black Carbon, the debate about the 
effectiveness of the charging scheme continued. There is a great degree of continuity with the debate about 
Ecopass in the period 2008-2011, in that it is still predominantly based on the discussion of scientific 
evidence on air pollutants.  
On the side of supporters of congestion charging, the city government has launched in February 2012 a 
monitoring project for BC, which involves AMAT and the research team responsible for the aforementioned 
study on BC in Milan (Invernizzi, et al., 2011). In this context, the municipality emphasises the implications 
for public health, by arguing, for example, that “by monitoring BC, it will be possible to relate more directly 
the efficiency of traffic limitations to the health of citizens”
21
. The results of the monitoring (which is still 
limited in scope), confirm that BC levels are lower in the charging area: a first report in March 2012 has 
found BC concentrations to be 28% lower in the city centre as compared to outside (AMAT, 2012a), while a 
subsequent report in July has reported a difference as high as 40% (AMAT, 2012c).  
It is important to note that, while the results of this monitoring tell something about difference in air quality 
between the charging area (where there is less traffic) and the rest of the city, this is not enough to 
demonstrate that the charging scheme has brought about a reduction in BC levels: in order to prove that, 
time-series data (currently not available) would have to be provided. Despite these limitations, the city 
government has emphasised the significance of these research findings for public health, suggesting a 
positive effect of the charging scheme. For example the new Transport, Mobility & Environment Local 
Councillor Pierfrancesco Maran has stated in February 2012 that “as of today, we are not able to have an 
impact on the levels of PM10 and PM2.5 (..). However, we can impact on toxicity and the monitoring on BC 
confirms that in less congested areas we breathe a better air”
22
. Similarly, media have often attributed the 
lower levels of BC in the city centre to Area C, overlooking the complexities involved in the monitoring.   
6.4 The use of evidence on BC and PM by opponents of Area C 
Also opponents of congestion charging draw extensively on evidence on concentrations of air pollutants: 
interestingly, however, they tend to focus on other indicators, namely PM10. Indeed, as far as PM levels are 
concerned, 2012 seems to be one of the worst years in the last decade for Northern Italy
23
. In this situation, 
critics of Area C tend to stress the ineffectiveness of the scheme in curbing particulate matter concentrations 
and complying with EU directives. To mention but one example, Riccardo De Corato, ex Transport Local 
Councillor and current member of the city council for Popolo della libertà (centre-right) commented on a 
report on air pollution in the following way: “the quality of air is getting worse: punishing car drivers is not 
enough, air pollution keeps increasing anyway. The Mayor should rather focus on home heating (..)”
24
.  
However, opponents of congestion charging do not limit themselves at reminding of high concentrations of 
PM. Interestingly, they seem to question the legitimacy of BC as an indicator for air quality improvements 
and related health impacts. For example, the association of city centre residents Residenti 5o Charge has 
criticized the use of Black Carbon statistics made by the city government by arguing that “as the data on 
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PM10 do not stand up to scrutiny, the city government talks about elusive Black Carbon”
25
. Notably, the 
association argues that at no point the monitoring demonstrates that current Black Carbon levels are to be 
considered as dangerous for health
26
. In a nutshell, opponents of congestion charging accuse the city 
government of making instrumental use of evidence, using it, in the context of widespread concerns for the 
health related impacts of air pollution, to push forward a “hidden agenda” aimed at the reduction of car use 
in the city.  
7. Conclusion 
The case of Milan is arguably one of the most interesting for research on the acceptability of road pricing: in 
this city, widespread concern about high levels of air pollution led to the implementation of a pollution 
charge for the access to the city centre in 2008, then upgraded to a fully-fledged congestion charging scheme 
in 2012. This stands in stark contrast with the experience of other European cities (London, Stockholm, 
Edinburgh, Manchester), where the focus has been on reductions in congestion levels, rather than on 
pollution. This difference in focus is arguably the main reason for the high levels of acceptance of congestion 
charging in Milan, as demonstrated by the surprising results of the 2011 bottom-up referendum. In that sense, 
there are indeed “lessons to be learnt” from the story of Milan’s congestion charging.   
Moreover, the implications of this case study for research on the use of evidence in environmental policy 
making are also substantial, as shown by the analysis of the local public debate in the years 2008-2012. In 
this respect we argue that, firstly, EU air quality directives have opened a “window of opportunity” for 
political entrepreneurs (such as Prof. Croci and the association Milano si Muove) who intended to push 
through congestion charging in order to limit car use in Milan. Secondly, the actions of the centre-left 
administration in charge since 2011 can be interpreted as an attempt to “decouple” congestion charging from 
the issue of air pollution. However, this (half-hearted) effort has encountered only limited success: as of 
today, both opponents and supporters of congestion charging still make extensive use of evidence on air 
pollution to support their arguments. Moreover, our study shows that there is an interesting tendency to use 
the air quality statistics that conforms to the actor’s agenda, taking advantage of the plurality of competing 
indicators in atmospheric research. In this context, the increasing use of Black Carbon as a PM metric seems 
advantageous for congestion charging supporters, as it provides them with a suitable indicator to demonstrate 
air quality improvements. On the other hand, congestion charging opponents increasingly question what they 
see as an opportunistic and instrumental use of evidence on the part of the city government, and prefer to rely 
on well-established PM10 indicators that allows them to argue that congestion charging is ineffective and thus 
avoidable. Accordingly, we argue that the case of Milan congestion charging provides an illustration of how 
actors can make strategic use of evidence in environmental policy making.  
In prospective terms, the findings of this paper imply that future developments in EU directives and/or in 
atmospheric research are likely to have a big impact on Milan congestion charging. Notably, it seems likely 
that European Court of Justice will eventually fine Italy for exceeding PM10 levels in several areas of the 
country (including, but not limited to, Milan and the Po Valley). Also, the EU will probably set limit values 
for Black Carbon in the next few years, which will possibly complement (rather than substitute) existing 
limit values for other pollutants
27
. How these developments might impact on the evolution of congestion 
charging in Milan is an interesting subject for speculation.   
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